new evidence is based primarily on a comparative analysis of developments in the United States and United Kingdom. In particular, we attempt to separate the impact of increased regulatory controls in the United States (stemming from the 1962 amendments to the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act)1 from other factors by using the U.K. industry as a control. Since firms in the latter country have been governed by a very different regulatory system but are similar to U.S. firms in most other ways, we feel that comparative analysis is a very fruitful way of approaching this question.
INNOVATION in the U.S. ethical drug industry in recent years has been characterized by a number of adverse developments. In particular, there has been a sharp decline in the rate of new product introductions and the incentive for engaging in research and development (R & D) activity has been negatively influenced by rapid increases in the costs and risks of developing new products. While there is little debate about the existence of these adverse trends, there is considerable controversy about the factors producing them.
Briefly, we list below five hypotheses that have been discussed as explanations for the declining rate of innovation.
(1) Tighter regulation of the industry by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has been largely responsible for the declining rate of innovation.
(2) The decline is illusory-while there has been a decline in the total number of new drugs being introduced, the number of "important" new drugs introduced annually has not declined. (3) There has been a "depletion of research opportunities" brought about by the rapid rate of new drug development in the 1950s. (4) The tragic thalidomide episode in the early 1960s made drug firms and physicians much more cautious in their decisions concerning the marketing and prescribing of new drugs. (5) Advances in pharmacological science have led to increased safety testing and, therefore, higher costs of developing new drugs. In this paper, we present some new evidence on these hypotheses. Our formidable increase in the costs of producing an NCE, an increase which has been documented in studies by Clymer, Mund, and Sarett.5 In particular, Sarett suggests that over the decade 1962 to 1972, development costs per NCE rose from 1.2 to 11.5 million dollars.
iii) Increasing Risks for Innovation. In addition, there appears to be a corresponding increase in the risks and uncertainty associated with innovational activity. One measure of risk in this industry is the attrition rates for compounds that undergo clinical testing but fail to become commercial products. Clymer6 estimates that in the 1950s, the attrition rate of drugs undergoing clinical tests was two out of three. The best estimate of the current situation appears to be that less than one of every ten new compounds entering clinical trials become new products.7
In short, the decline in new product outputs in the drug industry has been accompanied by a number of adverse structural trends on the input side of the innovational process. Total development time and costs have increased severalfold. Furthermore, innovation has become subject to greater risks and uncertainty. These adverse structural trends in both innovational inputs and outputs appear related to more fundamental underlying changes in the The 1962 Kefauver-Harris amendments extended the regulatory controls of the FDA in several ways. First, it required firms to submit documented scientific evidence on a new drug's efficacy as well as its safety. This led to a substantial increase in the number of tests that had to be performed and submitted to the FDA. Second, the FDA was given discretionary power over the clinical research process. Thus, prior to any testing in humans, firms must now submit a new drug investigational plan (IND) that provides the results of animal tests and plans for human testing. Third, the new regulations provided for FDA approval of advertising claims. Finally, the provision of automatic approval of a new drug application (NDA) after sixty days unless the FDA took specific action was effectively repealed.
Over the post-1962 period, therefore, there has been a significant increase in both the scope and intensity of regulatory controls on ethical drugs. As a consequence, it has been postulated that the costs of discovering and developing a new drug, along with the risks and uncertainty of drug innovation, have increased; and that this, in turn, has been a major factor in the observed decline in innovational output.
ii) Fewer Marginal and Ineffective Drugs. The initial response of the FDA to hypothesis (i) was to argue that the observed decline in pharmaceutical innovation is in fact illusory:
The relevant question is not and never has been how many new drugs are marketed each year, but rather how many significant, useful and unique therapeutic entities are developed .... The rate of development and marketing of truly important, significant, and unique therapeutic entities in this country has remained relatively stable for the past 22 years.8
Unfortunately, it is difficult to substantiate this FDA claim as there is no list of important new drugs upon which there is general agreement by medi-8 Speech by Alexander Schmidt, The FDA Today: Critics, Congress, and Consumerism (Oct. 29, 1974 before the Nat'l Press Club, Wash., D.C.). cal experts. Most lists from academic sources, for example, show a significant downward trend in important therapeutic advances, as does at least one prior FDA ranking of important new drugs.9 Furthermore, measures of pharmaceutical innovation based on economic criteria strongly suggest that a significant decline in real terms has occurred. The data presented in Table  1 , in particular, indicate that the total market shares captured by NCEs have declined over time in comparable fashion to the total number of NCE
introductions.l? Sam
Peltzman has analyzed a related drug quality issue as to whether the large decline in NCE introductions could be explained by fewer ineffective drugs entering the marketplace after the 1962 amendments were passed. His analysis of data from three groups of experts-hospitals, panels employed by state public-assistance agencies, and the American Medical Association's Council on Drugs-does not support this view. These data suggest only a small fraction of the pre-1962 and post-1962 NCE introductions could be classified as ineffective.11
In sum, the hypothesis that the observed decline in new product introductions has largely been concentrated in marginal or ineffective drugs is not generally supported by empirical analyses. Moreover, these data analyses show no real tendency for more recently introduced drugs to have either significantly higher average market shares or efficacy rates than those introduced in earlier periods.
iii) Depletion of Research Opportunities. More recently, the FDA (along with some prominent members of the biomedical community) have emphasized a very different hypothesis-that the decline in pharmaceutical innovation is real, but that it is due to a depletion of research opportunities rather than increased regulation. This hypothesis has been described by former FDA Commissioner Schmidt as follows:
Henry G. Grabowski, Drug Regulation and Innovation: Empirical Evidence and Policy
Options (Am. Enterprise Inst. 1976).
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Market measures are premised on the notion that drugs which obtain the largest shares do so because they offer consumers the most overall utility per dollar. One can argue, however, that some drugs which have important therapeutic properties, but for relatively rare diseases, will tend to obtain low market shares. In addition, market shares are presumably influenced not only by the therapeutic advance of a new drug but also by the innovating firm's market power, promotional strategies, and so forth. However, for the broad aggregate comparison presented above, these qualifications are not as important as they might be in other situations. This is because there is no reason to believe that these factors have changed markedly over time, especially not in a direction so as to produce the lower market shares for new drugs shown above. For example, it seems unlikely that the lower market shares can be plausibly accounted for by a shift toward the production of a relatively greater number of drugs for rare diseases. l In particular, these data suggest the incidence of ineffective new drugs was less than 10 % in the preand post-1962 period. Peltzman also analyzes the growth rate patterns of NCEs in the preand post-1962 periods and argues they also support the findings of expert evaluations in this regard. Today's world includes a great number of important therapeutic agents unknown a generation ago. These include antibiotics, antihypertensive drugs, diuretics, antipsychotic drugs, tranquilizers, cancer chemotherapeutic agents, and a host of others .... In many of these important drug groups there are already a large number of fairly similar drugs. As the gaps in biomedical knowledge decrease, so do the opportunities for the development of new or useful related drugs. As shown by the declining number of new single entity drugs approved in the U.S., England, France, and Germany, this is an international phenomenon. This does not reflect a loss of innovative capacity, but rather reflects the normal course of a growth industry as it becomes technologically more mature.12
See
Adherents of the research-depletion hypothesis therefore are suggesting that in many major therapeutic areas we have reached a point where the probability that a new discovery will be an advance over existing therapies is quite low. Furthermore, they argue we are on a research plateau because the major disease areas left to conquer are the ones where we have the least adequate scientific understanding of the underlying biological processes. Hence, they suggest that considerable investments of basic research may be necessary before a new cycle of increased drug discoveries is likely to occur. They further point to the lower levels of drug introductions in other developed countries (where regulation has been less stringent than the United States) as important supportive evidence that a worldwide depletion of scientific opportunities has occurred in the pharmaceutical industry.
This hypothesis has been received with considerable skepticism in many scientific quarters. Some have challenged the hypotheses on conceptual v) Advances in Pharmacological Science. Finally, Dr. Pettinga of Eli Lilly and others have pointed to scientific advances in pharmacological science over the past few decades as another potentially important factor. In particular, he suggests that these advances, which have made teratology and toxicological studies much more sophisticated and costly in nature, would have been incorporated into drug firm testing procedures even in the absence of regulatory requirements to do so.16 That is, drug firms would undertake many of these tests in their own self-interest, in order to reduce the likelihood of future losses in goodwill and potential legal liabilities.
In sum, while our primary objective in this paper is to identify the effects of increased regulation on declining levels of pharmaceutical innovation, a number of plausible alternative factors to regulation must also be considered. After briefly reviewing prior empirical work in the next section, we will turn to an international comparative approach to analyze these hypotheses. 
C. Prior Empirical Work i) Sam Peltzman's Study. Sam Peltzman's cost-benefit analysis of the 1962 amendments has received considerable attention in both economic and policy circles. We shall restrict our review here to only his analysis of the effects of the amendments on the rate and character of drug innovation.l7

In this formulation, R & D productivity (or NCEs per dollar of R & D invested) is related in a statistically and quantitatively significant manner to proxy variables for both regulation and research depletion. For example, the estimated coefficient on Dt implies that the annual expenditures required to develop a constant number of new drugs more than tripled in the postamendment period.21
The Baily model therefore appears to perform well and suggests that both the regulation and research depletion hypotheses are valid. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that this specification does embody a number of strong
assumptions. First, the model implies a fixed lag as well as constant returns to scale in the relation of NCE introductions to R & D expenditures. Second, the seven-year moving average formulation for the depletion variable has a somewhat arbitrary character; it also does not formally allow for additions to the stock of knowledge. Third, the zero-one dummy variable formulation for regulatory effects imposes the same shift factor on the entire postamendment period (rather than a differential response over time). Finally, no attempt is made to consider additional factors such as those presented in hypotheses (iv) and (v) above.22 21 Baily presents the estimated regulatory effect on costs only implicitly in a table showing the annual expenditure required to develop a constant number of drugs, before and after the 1962 change in regulation. This table indicates that costs increased by a factor of 2.35 beginning in 1962. However, these cost figures confound regulatory and depletion effects, and further embody the rather dubious property that the effect of depletion on costs after 1962 has only about half the magnitude of pre-1962 effects. This property follows from the assumption that the flow of drugs from non-U.S.-industry sources is lower in the post-1962 period and Baily's formulation of the depletion variable.
The direct regulatory effect, holding depletion constant, is calculated from the coefficient on the dummy variable, which, given Baily's specification, implies an increase in costs by a factor of 3.8. Martin N. Baily, supra note 2.
22 Hence, the main finding of our reanalysis is that the coefficient of the depletion variable has become statistically insignificant, though it does continue to have the expected negative sign. The explanatory power of our reestimated equation also has declined substantially from that obtained by Baily (the R2 declined from 0.95 to 0.88). Furthermore, a number of other functional specifications were analyzed and the research depletion variable performed poorly in each instance.23
Thus, neither the studies of Peltzman nor Baily would seem to provide completely satisfactory approaches for isolating the effects of increased regulation on pharmaceutical innovation from other confounding factors. Although Baily's production function model does provide a conceptual basis for separating regulatory factors from other supply side factors like research depletion, his proxy variable for research depletion is obviously highly unstable when extended forward in time.
In the next section, we present our own methodological approach for empirically isolating the effects of regulation from other factors. It is based on an international comparative analysis of developments in the United States and United Kingdom which we believe offers some important advantages over the time series analysis of a single country.
II. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE U.S.
AND THE U.K. INDUSTRIES
Under ideal laboratory conditions, one would wish to observe the behavior of innovation in the United States in two states of the world: one with the inputs in the pharmaceutical industry. There is some evidence to indicate that the movements of the two trends are highly correlated so that the gross national product deflator is an adequate proxy. See Nat'l Science Foundation, NSF72-310, A Price Index for the Deflation of Academic R & D Expenditures (May 1972).
23 In particular, we examined both the multiplicative and linear functional specification and a number of formulations that relaxed various strong assumptions embodied in equation (1) (for example, fixed lag, regulatory dummy shift variable, and so forth). These generalizations are discussed in Table 3 , in the context of our international analysis. However, the research depletion variable employed by Baily was never statistically significant in any of these alternative specifications. 1962 amendments in effect and one where they were not in effect. Given the impossibility of this experiment, a "second-best" experiment would be to find another country which was as similar to the United States as possible, and in which the regulatory pattern before and after 1962 was similar to that of the United States prior to 1962. The United Kingdom appears to be the best candidate for such an experiment.
In In 1963, the Committee on Safety on Drugs was established in the United Kingdom to undertake premarket safety reviews of drugs. Hence, the U.K. system after 1963 incorporated the basic requirement of premarket safety reviews that had been in effect in the United States for many years before 1962. At the same time, the United Kingdom did not institute most of the requirements associated with the 1962 amendments. Specifically, the United Kingdom did not require formal proof of efficacy until the Medicines Act was implemented in 1971;25 before this act, the task of evaluating a drug's efficacy was essentially left to the market mechanism. In addition, the U.K. Firms in the U.K. ethical drug industry should also be similarly affected by the nonregulatory factors cited in hypotheses (iii) to (v) above. First, the factor receiving the most attention--research depletion-certainly should not operate only in one particular country, but should be worldwide in scope. This is especially so given the rapid diffusion of knowledge concerning new drug discoveries throughout all developed countries. Secondly, the thalidomide incident as a factor making drug firms and prescribing physicians more cautious and thereby leading to higher costs of innovation would also be expected to operate abroad as well as in the United States. Indeed, since the United Kingdom was a country directly affected by thalidomide, one might expect it to play a greater role there than in the United States. Third, technical advances in the detection of adverse effects of new drugs would also be available to foreign firms who wished to use them for reasons of self-interest in the absence of any regulatory prodding.
A comparison of the United States and the United Kingdom therefore, would seem insightful because the regulatory environment of each country after 1962 was very different in character, while the other hypothesized nonregulatory factors for the decline in innovation in the United States would tend to operate in a similar (but not necessarily identical) manner across the two countries. Two basic problems do arise, however, which must be considered: first, the U.K. regulatory environment has not been static during the period of analysis, but rather has also experienced regulatory change, culminating in the important Medicines Act of 1971; second, there are multinational linkages across the two countries.
To deal with the former problem we will structure our analysis as follows. First, to avoid confounding the effects of depletion, thalidomide, and techni- 33 It is interesting to note that the percentage of U.K. introductions accounted for by U.S. discoveries starts increasing during the seventies. In this regard, there are plausible reasons for expecting "echo" effects to be much greater in the short run (that is, the initial post-1962 period). This is because of the institutional procedures and strategies followed by U.S. firms in the preamendment period. In an earlier paper we found that, prior to 1962, most U.S.-discovered drugs were introduced in foreign markets, such as the United Kingdom, only after being introduced in the United States. Furthermore, many NCEs were initially manufactured here and exported abroad, in accordance with the product-life-cycle theory. Thus, at the time when regulatory conditions became more stringent in 1962, the rate of foreign introductions was quite directly tied to the level of U.S. introductions. In other words, foreign countries were generally 
In summary, a comparative international analysis does not provide an independent control like that of a laboratory experiment for two basic reasons. First, the regulatory environments in foreign countries like the United Kingdom have not remained completely fixed over time but have become more stringent in nature. Second, the drug industry has a significant multinational nature, so that increased regulatory controls in the United States would be expected to have some negative spillover effects on foreign country introductions and R & D activity. Although neither problem can be completely avoided, we hope to minimize the biases from spillover effects by focusing on R & D productivity (rather than total introductions) in each country. With regard to the biases which remain, we structure our analysis so that we obtain conservative estimates of regulatory effects. Thus, we wish to see whether a significant effect of regulation can be observed from our comparison of the United States and United Kingdom, even when the analysis is deliberately structured to produce an underestimate of regulatory effects.
C. Simple Comparative Productivity Trends
In this section, we present the basic comparative trends of the dependent variable for our analysis, R & D productivity. As discussed above, we use the term "productivity" to refer to the variable Baily defined as Nt/E t, that is, the number of new chemical entities discovered and introduced in a country per effective R & D dollar. Following this, we present regression results, 34 One reason for expecting this might be so is that our data suggest a much greater tendency for U. K. firms to license U.S. firms to develop and market drugs in the United States compared to the reverse situation involving U.S. introductions in the United Kingdom. One apparent reason for this is the unwillingness of the FDA historically to accept foreign trials as acceptable proof of safety and efficacy and its requirement that all applicable clinical trials be performed in the United
David Schwartzman, The Expected Return from Pharmaceutical Research 26-28 (Am. Enterprise Inst. 1975), has estimated that approximately 50% of the U.S. industry's ethical drug R & D expenditures over the period 1961-1967 were for the discovery and development of new NCEs as opposed to the development of other drug products (combinations, new dosage forms, and so forth). Thus, the assumption that all R & D is for new NCEs tends to somewhat understate R & D productivity in absolute terms (for both countries).
36 See Henry G. Grabowski, supra note 9, at 44-48, for an analysis of the amount of R & D activity performed abroad by U.S. firms in recent years. Table 2 should ideally be adjusted for any systematic differences in the quality of NCE introductions discovered in the United States and the United Kingdom. Teeling-Smith37 has performed an analysis of the relative quality of discoveries in each country on all NCEs for which the first worldwide introduction occurred between 1958 and 1970. He found that U.S. discoveries for this period on average achieved a somewhat higher rating in terms of a quality index based on worldwide sales but a roughly comparable rating for a quality index based on medical importance (as evaluated by U.K. medical experts).38 He concluded that a modest adjustment of the raw productivity calculation is warranted in comparing the two countries because of the higher overall quality of NCEs discovered in the United States. His findings in this regard are therefore consistent with somewhat higher (unadjusted) productivity for the United Kingdom in Table 2 for the initial period, 1960-61. Of course, this could also reflect differences in market structures, pre-1962 regulatory environment, and so forth.
The productivities calculated in
Since our primary interest here is in the relative trends in productivity over time, we have included in Table 2 an index of productivities for each country, with productivity in 1966-1970 arbitrarily taken as 100.
The data presented in Table 2 
clearly show that there has been a significant decline in the R & D productivities for the two countries over the postamendment period. However, perhaps the most interesting result is the much stronger relative decline in R & D productivity that the United States experienced in the decade after 1962. In particular, there is an approximate sixfold productivity decline in the United States and threefold decline in the United Kingdom between 1960-61 and 1966-70. Hence, over this period in which the United States shifted to a much more stringent regulatory environment than the United Kingdom, it also experienced a much more rapid decline in R & D productivity. We should also note the steeper decline in productivity in the United Kingdom compared to the United States between 1966-70 and 1970-74. A plausible explanation for this phenomenon might be the onset of tighter regulation in the United Kingdom beginning in 1971.
Finally, the decline in the United Kingdom between 1960 and 1971 exhibited a much more steady trendlike character than in the United States. This is reflected in the data in Table 2 by Although these comparisons of simple R & D productivities are hardly definitive, they do suggest some important differences in the observed shifts in R & D productivities for these two countries. In the next section, we report the results of an econometric analysis in which we incorporate a measure of nonregulatory factors based on U.K. data into a production function model of the Baily type.
D. A Regression Analysis of U.S. R & D Productivity
In Part I (C), we reestimated Baily's model on U.S. data for the entire 1954-1974 period and found that his measure for depletion (that is, a moving average of past total introductions) became statistically insignificant. In this section, we analyze a similar production function model but make a number of significant changes in the basic functional specification. i) Controlling for Nonregulatory Effects Using U.K. Data. The initial specification that we consider is: In this specification, we estimate the effects of nonregulatory factors using a time trend calculated from U.K. R & D productivity data. In particular, we assume that in the absence of regulatory differences, R & D productivity in the United States would decline at an identical percentage rate as that for the United Kingdom. Under this assumption, the annual rate of decline of R & D productivity for the United Kingdom provides an external estimate of the impact of the nonregulatory factors for the United States.
In implementing this approach in terms of equation (2), the coefficient on the time trend variable after 1960 is restricted to equal the estimated decline in U.K. productivity after 1960. For the period before 1960, for which no U.K. productivity data are available, we use an unrestricted time trend to control for nonregulatory factors. The effects of the 1962 amendments are represented in this specification by the dummy shift variable Dt that takes on the value 1 after 1962 and 0 before.
Of course, the estimated rate of R & D productivity decline in the United Kingdom probably includes some negative effects from increased regulation in the United Kingdom as well as some "echo" effects for the United Kingdom of increased U.S. regulation. As argued above, we believe these echo effects are minimal since we are analyzing discoveries of U.K. origin rather than total introductions, but some effect is probably unavoidable. However, by attributing all of the decline to factors other than regulation, we will, if anything, obtain a conservative estimate of the impact of regulation.
In addition, the functional specification given by equation (2) retains a number of strong assumptions made by Baily as discussed in Section I (C) above. In the subsequent analysis, we will relax many of these assumptions.
The Table 2 .
This is similar in magnitude to the rough calculations that we made on the basis of the productivity indices in
The functional specification given by equation (2') of course still retains a number of strong assumptions. In the analysis which follows, we relax a number of these assumptions in order to test the sensitivity of these results.
ii) Alternative Functional Specifications. We analyzed a number of alternative functional specifications to the log-linear formulation given by equation (2'). The best-fitting equation turned out to be the specification where the dependent and independent variables are all expressed in logarithmic units.41 This formulation is presented as equation (3.1) in Table 3 . It apparently results in an improvement in explanatory power over the log-linear case because it allows for a diminishing rate of productivity decline over time, rather than the constant rate implied in equation (2). However, aside from this difference, there is little change from the log-linear formulation. Indeed, the estimated coefficient on the regulatory shift variable, -.86, is virtually the same as before. 
All the formulations analyzed to this point assume constant returns to scale between NCE introductions and past R & D expenditures. This assumption allows us to formulate our dependent variable as R & D productivity, N/E, and facilitates the econometric estimation of the model. As a check on the reasonableness of this assumption, we reestimated equation (3.1) (and the other variants of this model discussed below) with the inclusion of In Et on the right-hand side as another independent variable. The coefficients of
Notes:
(1) t-statistics are given in parentheses.
( coefficients on the other variables remained quite stable.42 Hence, the constant-returns-to-scale assumption seems warranted.
We also tested the significance of the restriction imposed on the post-1960 trend variable for each specification in Table 3 by Table 3 ranged from 0.10 to 1.45, all of which prevent rejection of the restriction at standard levels of significance.
In a strict sense, the estimated trend of U.K. depletion is not exact, but rather is an unbiased estimate of the trend which possesses substantial variance. If estimates of both mean and variance for coefficients of time trend variables are taken from the United Kingdom, they may be used in the method of J. Durbin, A Note on Regression when There Is Extraneous Informa-iii) Regulatory Stringency. In our earlier discussion, we observed that the use of the zero-one dummy variable Dt to represent the effects of the 1962 amendments embodies a rather strong assumption. That is, it imposes the same shift factor on the entire postamendment period rather than a more plausible differential effect over time. To attempt to overcome this problem, we substitute a continuous proxy variable of regulatory stringency S t for the shift variable Dr. In particular, our measure of St is the mean FDA approval time for a new NCE in each year (that is, the estimated time elapsing between the initial submission of a new drug application (NDA) and its final approval by the FDA). The available data on this question, which is admittedly quite crude, suggests FDA approval time steadily increased from seven months in 1962 until reaching a plateau of twenty-seven months in the period after 1967 (see the Appendix for further details). Table 3 shows the results of employing St to measure regulatory stringency, once again using the logarithmic specification of the model. The St variable is statistically significant and has the expected negative sign. Moreover, the estimated value of the coefficient suggests a cumulative impact from regulation that is comparable in magnitude to that previously estimated. In particular, it implies that increased regulation has caused the average cost per NCE to be larger in the post-1967 period by a factor of 1.86 compared to the pre-1962 period.45
Equation (3.2) of
It should be kept in mind that this measure of regulatory stringency, by its very nature, only considers drugs that successfully gain FDA approval. Another element of regulatory stringency which influences R & D productivity is the attrition rate on drugs that are clinically tested in man but fail to become NCEs. As discussed above, the attrition rate on clinically tested drugs has also significantly increased in the post-1962 period.46 Hence, the development of a more composite index of regulatory stringency would seem to be a useful direction for further research. 46 If this element of regulatory stringency had a more direct and immediate impact on R & D productivity than lengthening approval times, which is not implausible, this may help explain why the Dt shift variable performs slightly better than S in Table 3 . This is a question on which further research seems warranted. good data is not available, there is considerable evidence which suggests that the average lag has increased significantly over the period we are studying.47 Using the best estimates we could obtain on the average lag in different time periods, as well as some linear extrapolations, we constructed a variable lag variant of the equations estimated above. While the details of this construction are given in the Appendix, the basic assumption is that the average lag between expenditures and NCE introduction increased from 2.5 to 8 years over this period in the United States and increased by a somewhat lesser amount in the United Kingdom. Table 3 present the estimates for this variable lag variant of the model.48 Essentially, the results are qualitatively similar to those given in the top half of Table 3 
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) in
. The estimates for this increasing lag formulation do indicate moderately lower impacts for the regulatory variables.49 This is what one would expect, since an increasing lag over time (compared with the fixed lag used previously) operates to reduce the size of the decline in our R & D productivity dependent variable. However, it also should be kept in mind that an increasing lag by itself has a negative effect on innovative output and social welfare. Since it is commonly held that regulation is a major cause of this lag, it is appropriate to regard the estimated coefficients on Dt and St in equations (3.3) and (3.4) as only partial measures of the negative effects of regulation on innovative output and productivity.
To review briefly, all of the variants of the model analyzed imply a statistically significant and quantitatively important impact of the 1962 amendments. In particular, making conservative assumptions throughout, the estimated coefficients imply that increased regulation caused average costs per NCE to rise by a factor of between 1.8 and 2.3 over the first decade following the amendments. This amounts to more than one-third of the total increase in average costs experienced during this period. the two countries disaggregated by therapeutic class. This would allow one to see whether significant differences do exist and, if so, whether these differences might be plausibly associated with regulatory differences.53 In order to undertake such an analysis, however, the necessary R & D data would have to be obtained from individual firm questionnaires, since these data are not presently available from public sources. 50 
E. Qualifications and Possible Extensions
It should be borne in mind that our analysis focuses only on the direct effects of regulation on R & D productivity or the average cost of discovering and introducing a new NCE. To the extent that increased regulation in fact has significantly increased the cost of introducing a new NCE, as our analy-
We experimented with some simple reduced-form models on R & D expenditures that included regulation as well as various other supply-and-demand side factors as explanatory variables. Formulation of these equations on the basis of an optimality model incorporating our production function equation and a demand function results in a quite complex lag structure between R & D and the different explanatory variables. Using some very simple lag structures
as a first approximation, we generally obtained the expected sign on the explanatory variables; but they were frequently not statistically significant. If one had a greater data base than the annual time series observations available here, one could presumably estimate these equations in a more precise fashion. 51 David Schwartzman, supra note 35, at 36. 52 For a summary of this work see Louis Lasagna & William M. Wardell, supra note 7, Part II, at 51-123.
53 For example, it is presumably much easier to prove efficacy for an antibiotic than for several other classes such as cardiovascular drug therapies. Wardell found a much greater drug lag in the latter case compared to the former one. It would be useful to see if such patterns also emerge in a comparison of R & D producturies.
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry has been subject to a number of adverse structural developments in recent years. There has been a sharp decline in the annual number of introductions of new chemical entities and rapid increases in costs and risks. We have reviewed these developments and listed five hypotheses that have been used to explain them: (1) increased regulation of the industry associated with the 1962 amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is the cause; (2) the decline is illusory since only ineffective NCEs have declined; (3) a depletion of research opportunities has taken place; (4) the thalidomide incident has made firms and physicians more cautious; and (5) costs have risen as a result of advances in the technology of safety testing.
In order to separate the effects of regulation from these other confounding factors, we developed an international comparative analysis of R & D productivity changes in the United States and the United Kingdom.
A principal finding that emerges from this international comparative analysis is that U.S. "productivity"-defined as the number of new chemical entities discovered and introduced in the United States per dollar of R & D expenditure-declined by about sixfold between 1960-61 and 1966-70. The corresponding decrease in the United Kingdom was about threefold. Clearly, some worldwide phenomenon, which might be labelled a "depletion of research opportunities"-but which probably also includes the effects of other factors such as the thalidomide incident and higher costs due to new developments in safety testing-seems to hold for pharmaceutical R & D. However, there is also strong support for the hypothesis that an additional factor has been at work in the U.S. industry.
We conclude that this additional factor, which has lowered U.S. productivity at a significantly more rapid rate, is the increased regulation resulting from the 1962 amendments. On the basis of the regression analysis presented in Section III, we estimate that the 1962 amendments have probably, at a minimum, doubled the cost of a new entity.
Our analysis also suggests that nonregulatory factors have an important aggregative effect on innovation, but does not allow us to say which factors in particular have been most important in this respect. Further research on this question would seem warranted.
APPENDIX
This appendix presents in summary form the sources and methods of computation for statistics used in the paper. 
NCE INTRODUCTIONS AND DISCOVERIES
Data on new chemical entities and their years of introduction for both the United
